

POFMA-DC-2026-03-01

26 Mar 2026

Xu Yuan Chen (alias Terry Xu) and Miao Yi Infotech Ltd

Served via electronic communication to terry@theonlinecitizen.com, admin@theonlinecitizen.asia, theonlinecitizen@gmail.com, heidohai@gmail.com and myinfotech@proton.me.

Dear Sirs,

**CORRECTION DIRECTION (THE “DIRECTION”)
PURSUANT TO SECTION 11 OF THE PROTECTION FROM ONLINE FALSEHOODS AND
MANIPULATION ACT 2019 (THE “ACT”)**

We refer to the following material (“**Subject Material**”) posted by you, which contains false statements of fact (“**Subject Statements**”) that are being or have been communicated in Singapore:

Table

<p>Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) of the online location where the Subject Statements are communicated</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. https://theonlinecitizen.com/2026/03/05/the-art-of-saying-everything-while-confirming-nothing 2. https://www.theonlinecitizen.com 3. https://heidoh.com 4. https://www.facebook.com/100064590917823/posts/1364477272381957/ 5. https://www.instagram.com/p/DVfhK-bjxsl/ 6. https://www.youtube.com/post/UgkxFrEuP5u91mzzlsWPH4JFL8lsUNQGk5tu
<p>Subject Statements</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs deliberately chose to give incomplete answers to the Parliamentary questions on the two Singaporeans who allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict.

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Apart from the information in the Declassified UK article, the Government had information to act on, including identifying information of the two Singaporeans who allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict, as evidenced from its formal request to Israel. 3. The Government is able to identify the two Singaporeans who have allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict but has chosen not to identify them. 4. The Government has deliberately chosen not to take action under the Internal Security Act 1960 against the two Singaporeans who have allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict in order to preserve diplomatic relations with Israel. 5. The Government did not issue directions under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 in respect of the source which stated that two Singaporeans had served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict because this statement was true. 6. The Government has decided not to use Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 against the two Singaporeans who have allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict, because of Singapore's cordial relations and longstanding defence and intelligence ties with Israel.
<p>Subject Material from which the Subject Statements are derived</p>	<p>Refer to Annex B</p>
<p>Date/Time when the Subject Statements were first communicated in Singapore</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The post at https://theonlinecitizen.com/2026/03/05/the-art-of-saying-everything-while-confirming-nothing was communicated on 5 Mar 2026. 2. The link to s/n 1 on https://www.theonlinecitizen.com was communicated on 5 Mar 2026. 3. The link to s/n 1 on https://heidoh.com was communicated on 5 Mar 2026.

	<ol style="list-style-type: none">4. The Facebook post at https://www.facebook.com/100064590917823/posts/1364477272381957/ was communicated on 5 Mar 2026, 1420 hrs (GMT+8).5. The Instagram post at https://www.instagram.com/p/DVfhK-bxjsj/ was communicated on 5 Mar 2026.6. The YouTube post at https://www.youtube.com/post/UgkxFrEuP5u91mzzIsWPH4JFL8IsUNQGk5tu was communicated on 5 Mar 2026.
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2 The Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, K Shanmugam (the “**Minister**”), is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to issue this Direction. The basis on which the Subject Statements are determined to be false statements of fact is set out in **Annex A**.

3 Pursuant to Section 11 of the Act, the Minister directs you to communicate the following correction notices in the form and manner as prescribed below.

Website – Correction Notice on Original Post

4 You must insert the following Correction Notice in relation to the website post at <https://theonlinecitizen.com/2026/03/05/the-art-of-saying-everything-while-confirming-nothing>.

<p>CORRECTION NOTICE:</p> <p>This post contains false statements of fact.</p> <p>An article published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026 alleged that two Singaporeans were serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) were posed to the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs on this issue. On 5 March 2026, the Minister replied to the PQs, stating that the Ministry for Home Affairs did not have any substantiated information that any Singaporean had served, or is serving, in the IDF; and that the Government has reached out to the Israeli Government for information but has not received a response.</p> <p>The Declassified UK article did not provide any identifying information of these two alleged Singaporeans or any specific information that would enable the Government to identify them. The Government has no information on the veracity of these allegations, nor to find out the identity of these two alleged</p>

Singaporeans. The purpose of the Government's request to the Israeli Government was precisely to request information on these two alleged Singaporeans. The Minister's reply to the PQs was given based on all the information available to him, and it is false to suggest that the Government had specific information to act on, or that the Government is able to identify the two alleged Singaporeans.

At this juncture, the Government is not able to take any action under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) or assess if an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed, as it does not have information about the veracity of the allegations, nor on the identity of the two alleged Singaporeans. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken against the two alleged Singaporeans.

For the same reasons, the Government is unable to verify whether any false statements of fact were made in the Declassified UK article. Consequently, no action was taken under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 against the Declassified UK article.

Singaporeans found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, regardless of the cause or side they are supporting, will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, including under the ISA if they are found to be a threat to our national security.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 5 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of additional text, situated at the top of the said website post.
 - (b) Must include a clickable hyperlink.
 - (c) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (d) Must be in a font size that is not smaller than the largest font size on the said website post.
 - (e) Must be inserted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Websites – Pinned Correction Notice on Main Page

- 6 In addition, you must post the following Correction Notice on the main page of the websites at:
- (a) <https://theonlinecitizen.com>;
 - (b) <https://www.theonlinecitizen.com>; and
 - (c) <https://heidoh.com>.

CORRECTION NOTICE:

An earlier post (dated 5 March 2026), contains false statements of fact.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 7 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be at the top of the said main page of the websites, except that if there are any existing POFMA notices therein, this Correction Notice must be placed directly below the existing POFMA notices.
 - (b) Must be in the form of text in a font size not smaller than the largest font size on the said main page of the websites.
 - (c) Must include a clickable hyperlink.
 - (d) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (e) Must be inserted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Pinned Post

- (f) In addition, the new post must remain at the top of the same main page of the websites until **23 Apr 2026, 1200 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Facebook

- 8 You must insert the following Correction Notice in relation to the Facebook post at <https://www.facebook.com/100064590917823/posts/1364477272381957/>.

CORRECTION NOTICE:

This post contains false statements of fact.

An article published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026 alleged that two Singaporeans were serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) were posed to the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs on this issue. On 5 March 2026, the Minister replied to the PQs, stating that the Ministry for Home Affairs did not have any substantiated information that any Singaporean had served, or is serving, in the IDF; and that the Government has reached out to the Israeli Government for information but has not received a response.

The Declassified UK article did not provide any identifying information of these two alleged Singaporeans or any specific information that would enable the Government to identify them. The Government has no information on the veracity of these allegations, nor to find out the identity of these two alleged Singaporeans. The purpose of the Government's request to the Israeli Government was precisely to request information on these two alleged Singaporeans. The Minister's reply to the PQs was given based on all the information available to him, and it is false to suggest that the Government had specific information to act on, or that the Government is able to identify the two alleged Singaporeans.

At this juncture, the Government is not able to take any action under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) or assess if an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed, as it does not have information about the veracity of the allegations, nor on the identity of the two alleged Singaporeans.

Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken against the two alleged Singaporeans.

For the same reasons, the Government is unable to verify whether any false statements of fact were made in the Declassified UK article. Consequently, no action was taken under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 against the Declassified UK article.

Singaporeans found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, regardless of the cause or side they are supporting, will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, including under the ISA if they are found to be a threat to our national security.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 9 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of additional text, situated at the top of the said Facebook post.
 - (b) Must include a clickable hyperlink.
 - (c) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (d) Must be inserted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

- 10 In addition, you must post the following Correction Notice on your Facebook page, i.e., the Facebook page accessible at <https://www.facebook.com/theonlinecitizen>.

CORRECTION NOTICE:

An earlier post (dated 5 Mar 2026) contains false statements of fact.

An article published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026 alleged that two Singaporeans were serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) were posed to the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs on this issue. On 5 March 2026, the Minister replied to the PQs, stating that the Ministry for Home Affairs did not have any substantiated information that any Singaporean had served, or is serving, in the IDF; and that the Government has reached out to the Israeli Government for information but has not received a response.

The Declassified UK article did not provide any identifying information of these two alleged Singaporeans or any specific information that would enable the Government to identify them. The Government has no information on the veracity of these allegations, nor to find out the identity of these two alleged Singaporeans. The purpose of the Government's request to the Israeli Government was precisely to request information on these two alleged Singaporeans. The Minister's reply to the PQs was given based on all the information available to him, and it is false to suggest that the

Government had specific information to act on, or that the Government is able to identify the two alleged Singaporeans.

At this juncture, the Government is not able to take any action under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) or assess if an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed, as it does not have information about the veracity of the allegations, nor on the identity of the two alleged Singaporeans. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken against the two alleged Singaporeans.

For the same reasons, the Government is unable to verify whether any false statements of fact were made in the Declassified UK article. Consequently, no action was taken under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 against the Declassified UK article.

Singaporeans found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, regardless of the cause or side they are supporting, will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, including under the ISA if they are found to be a threat to our national security.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 11 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of a new Facebook post.
 - (b) Must be in the form of text, situated at the top of the new Facebook post.
 - (c) Must include a clickable hyperlink.
 - (d) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (e) Must be posted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Pinned Post

- (f) In addition, the new post must be pinned such that it remains at the top of all the posts on your Facebook page until **23 Apr 2026, 1200 hrs (GMT+8)**.
- (g) The new post must be immediately visible upon accessing your Facebook page on any device or platform interface, without requiring any further navigation to view it, except that if there are any existing POFMA notices therein, this correction notice must be placed directly after the existing POFMA notices.

Instagram

12 You must insert the following Correction Notice in relation to the Instagram post at <https://www.instagram.com/p/DVfhK-bjxsi/>.

CORRECTION NOTICE:

This post contains false statements of fact.

The Government is aware of an article published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026, with information alleging that two Singaporeans were serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) were posed to the Minister for Home Affairs on this issue. On 5 March 2026, the Minister replied to the PQs, stating that the Ministry for Home Affairs did not have any substantiated information that any Singaporean had served, or is serving, in the IDF; and that the Government had reached out to the Israeli Government for information but has not received a response.

The Declassified UK article did not provide any identifying information of these two alleged Singaporeans or any specific information that would enable the Government to identify them. The Government has no information on the veracity of these allegations, nor to find out the identity of these two alleged Singaporeans. The purpose of the Government's request to the Israeli Government was precisely to request information on these two alleged Singaporeans. The Minister's reply to the PQs was given based on all the information available to him, and it is false to suggest that the Government had specific information to act on, or that the Government is able to identify the two alleged Singaporeans.


The Government is not able to take action under the Internal Security Act 1960, or assess if an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed, as it does not have information about the veracity of these allegations, nor on the identity of the two alleged Singaporeans. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken against the two alleged Singaporeans.

For the same reasons, the Government is unable to verify whether any false statements of fact were made in the Declassified UK article. Consequently, no action was taken under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 against the Declassified UK article.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 13 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of additional text, situated at the top of the caption of the said Instagram post.
 - (b) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (c) Must be inserted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

14 In addition, you must post the following Correction Notice on your Instagram page, i.e., the Instagram page accessible at <https://www.instagram.com/theonlinecitizen/>.



- 15 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of a new Instagram post.
 - (b) Must be in the form of the image above, a copy of which is attached to the email conveying this Direction.
 - (c) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (d) Must be posted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Pinned Post

- (e) In addition, the new post must be pinned such that it remains at the top of all the posts on your Instagram page until **23 Apr 2026, 1200 hrs (GMT+8)**.

YouTube

16 You must insert the following Correction Notice in relation to the YouTube post at <https://www.youtube.com/post/UgkxFrEuP5u91mzzlsWPH4JFL8IsUNQGk5tu>

CORRECTION NOTICE:

This post contains false statements of fact.

An article published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026 alleged that two Singaporeans were serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) were posed to the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs on this issue. On 5 March 2026, the Minister replied to the PQs, stating that the Ministry for Home Affairs did not have any substantiated information that any Singaporean had served, or is serving, in the IDF; and that the Government has reached out to the Israeli Government for information but has not received a response.

The Declassified UK article did not provide any identifying information of these two alleged Singaporeans or any specific information that would enable the Government to identify them. The Government has no information on the veracity of these allegations, nor to find out the identity of these two alleged Singaporeans. The purpose of the Government's request to the Israeli Government was precisely to request information on these two alleged Singaporeans. The Minister's reply to the PQs was given based on all the information available to him, and it is false to suggest that the Government had specific information to act on, or that the Government is able to identify the two alleged Singaporeans.

At this juncture, the Government is not able to take any action under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) or assess if an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed, as it does not have information about the veracity of the allegations, nor on the identity of the two alleged Singaporeans. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken against the two alleged Singaporeans.

For the same reasons, the Government is unable to verify whether any false statements of fact were made in the Declassified UK article. Consequently, no action was taken under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 against the Declassified UK article.

Singaporeans found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, regardless of the cause or side they are supporting, will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, including under the ISA if they are found to be a threat to our national security.

For the correct facts, visit: <https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326>

- 17 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form of additional text, situated at the top of the description section of the aforesaid YouTube post.
 - (b) Must include a clickable hyperlink.
 - (c) Must be published as a public post visible to all general users.
 - (d) Must be inserted by **26 Mar 2026, 1600 hrs (GMT+8)**.

Publish in The Straits Times

18 Pursuant to Section 11(3)(b) of the Act, you are also required to publish the following Correction Notice in The Straits Times.


CORRECTION NOTICE

On 5 March 2026, Xu Yuan Chen (alias Terry Xu) and Miao Yi Infotech Pte Ltd published an article on the websites and social media pages of The Online Citizen, as well as the Heidoh website. The article contained false statements that the Government chose not to take action against two Singaporeans who allegedly served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza conflict despite having the information to identify them.

The above statements are false.

The correct facts: The Government does not have information to verify these allegations, nor to identify these two alleged Singaporeans. Therefore, the Government is unable to take any action under our laws at this juncture. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Israel is not the reason why no action has been taken thus far. Singaporeans found to be fighting in foreign armed conflicts will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, regardless of the cause or side they support.

For the full facts, visit
<https://www.factually.gov.sg/corrections-and-clarifications/260326> or scan the QR Code.



Published by Xu Yuan Chen (alias Terry Xu) and Miao Yi Infotech

- 19 The preceding Correction Notice:
- (a) Must be in the form above (which includes the exact text and QR code), a copy of which is attached to the email conveying this Direction, subject to any formatting amendments made by SPH Media Limited (“SPH”).
 - (b) Must be ¼ page (27cm x 3 columns) sized, in black and white, and published on the third page of the main section of The Straits Times. If the third page is unavailable, the preceding Correction Notice must be published on the second page.

- (c) Must be sent via email to SPH at mop_pofma@sph.com.sg to arrange to publish the Correction Notice, with the POFMA Office admin@pofmaoffice.gov.sg kept on copy in all correspondence.
- (d) Must be published by **31 Mar 2026**. To meet this requirement, the booking for publication with SPH must be completed by **30 Mar 2026, 1200 hrs (GMT+8)**.

20 For the avoidance of doubt, you are responsible for any costs of complying with this Direction.

Important notes

21 Failure to comply with this Direction without reasonable excuse is an offence under Section 15 of the Act.

22 You can apply to the Minister to vary or cancel this Direction. Any application to vary or cancel this Direction must be made in writing and sent to **MHA_POFMA@mha.gov.sg**, with **admin@pofmaoffice.gov.sg** kept on copy in all correspondence. You may use the standard form available at **<https://pofmaoffice.gov.sg/resources/application-form>**, or otherwise satisfy the requirements that are set out in Regulation 13(3) of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Regulations 2019.

23 Any application to vary or cancel this Direction does not operate as a stay of the Direction. The Direction will remain in effect until it expires or is cancelled following the Minister's consideration of the application.

24 If the Minister refuses any variation or cancellation application that is brought in respect of this Direction, whether in whole or in part, you may appeal to the General Division of the High Court of Singapore pursuant to Section 17 of the Act against the Direction.

25 Any appeal that is brought against this Direction does not operate as a stay of the Direction, unless the General Division of the High Court directs pursuant to Section 17(7) of the Act that the Direction be stayed pending determination of the appeal. The Direction will cease to have effect only if it is set aside by the General Division of the High Court or the Court of Appeal, or if it expires or is cancelled following a decision of the Minister.

Yours faithfully

Director (Directions & Compliance)
for Executive Director,
POFMA Office
Info-communications Media Development Authority

Annex A

The basis on which the Subject Statements referenced in the Table are determined to be false statements of fact is set out below:

1. Subject Statement 1 is false:

- The Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs had provided answers to the Parliamentary Questions on the two Singaporeans who had allegedly served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict based on all the information available to him and did not deliberately choose to give incomplete answers.

2. Subject Statement 2 is false:

- The Government does not have any information regarding the veracity of the allegations in the Declassified UK article that two Singaporeans had served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict, nor on their identity. The article did not provide any particulars or identifying information of the two Singaporeans, nor any specific information which would enable the Government to identify them. The Government had therefore made a request to the Israeli Government to obtain information on the allegations and the two alleged Singaporeans.

3. Subject Statement 3 is false:

- As stated in the Minister's answers to the Parliamentary Questions, thus far, the Government has no information that any Singaporean had served or is serving in the IDF during the Gaza conflict, apart from the information in the article published by Declassified UK. Therefore, the Minister stated in the reply to the PQs that the Ministry of Home Affairs has no substantiated information confirming that any Singaporean has served, or is serving, in the IDF. The Declassified UK article did not provide any particulars or identifying information of the two Singaporeans who had allegedly served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict, nor any specific information which would enable the Government to identify them. The Government does not have information on the veracity of the allegations, nor to enable it to identify the two Singaporeans.
- The Government had therefore reached out to the Israeli Government to request for information on the allegations and the two alleged Singaporeans, and has not received any response thus far.

4. Subject Statement 4 is false:

- At this juncture, the Government does not have any information on the veracity of the allegations that two Singaporeans had served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict, nor on their identity. There is insufficient information to make an assessment on whether to take action under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA).

- As stated in the Minister's answers to the Parliamentary Questions, if Singaporeans are found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, these persons will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws, including under the ISA if they are found to be a threat to our national security. Many have been detained on such grounds in the past.

5. Subject Statement 5 is false:

- The Government does not have information to verify whether the allegations in the Declassified UK article that two Singaporeans had served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict is true or false. No assessment could therefore be made on whether there were false statements of fact made and consequently, no action under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 was taken.

6. Subject Statement 6 is false:

- At this juncture, the Government does not have any information on the veracity of the allegations that two Singaporeans had served in the IDF during the Gaza conflict, nor on their identity. There is insufficient information to make an assessment on whether an offence under Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 is disclosed.
- As stated in the Minister's answers to the Parliamentary Questions, if Singaporeans are found to be fighting or planning to fight in foreign armed conflicts, these persons will be dealt with sternly in accordance with our laws.

Annex B

Subject Material from which the Subject Statements are derived:

1. For Subject Statement 1:

“When Parliament asked about two Singaporeans allegedly found in Israeli military data, Minister K Shanmugam gave answers that were careful, precise, and notably incomplete. He denied nothing, confirmed little, and deployed none of the legal tools at his disposal. It was the response of a lawyer who knows exactly which doors to leave open.

There is a particular skill to answering questions in Parliament without actually answering them. K Shanmugam, a Senior Counsel with decades of legal practice before entering politics, demonstrated it with quiet precision on 5 March 2026.

The backdrop was a report published in February 2026 by British investigative outlet Declassified UK, which obtained Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) data through a freedom of information request showing that more than 50,000 soldiers holding Israeli nationality alongside at least one other citizenship had participated in the Gaza conflict.

Within that dataset, two Singapore passport holders were identified. The report named no individuals and gave no details of their roles or the duration of their service.

The findings were nonetheless enough to prompt three Members of Parliament to file questions asking whether the government had verified the claims, whether investigations had been initiated, and whether Singapore law had been breached.”

...

Asked whether the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) could confirm or deny the existence of these two individuals, Shanmugam deployed a masterclass in forensic language management. He did not say the individuals do not exist. He did not say the Declassified UK report was false. He said – very carefully – that MHA has “no substantiated information.” Not no information. Substantiated information.

That single adjective carries the weight of the entire response.

He confirmed a formal request had been made to Israel, which itself implies Singapore had something specific enough to act on diplomatically. You do not write a formal request to a foreign government about people you have no reason to believe exist.

To appreciate what MHA's investigative apparatus is actually capable of, consider the case of Mohamed Khairul Riduan Mohamed Sarip, a former MOE teacher arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in October 2022. Khairul had not travelled to Gaza. He had not joined Hamas. He had not crossed a single border.

Yet when Shanmugam addressed the media on 11 January 2023, he did not speak in vague terms about a general security concern.

He described, with precision, that the Internal Security Department (ISD) knew Khairul had checked specific travel routes and flight options to Gaza, sought advice from individuals based there, attempted to learn Arabic to communicate with Hamas soldiers, and researched the group's tactics and operations. Some of these plans had first formed in 2012 — more than a

decade before his arrest. ISD had not merely detected a threat. It had reconstructed a man's intentions across eleven years.

The proposition that this same apparatus, when presented with an official foreign military dataset identifying two Singapore passport holders by nationality, is left with "no substantiated information" is a considerable ask of the reader's credulity."

...

"ISD's detention orders in cases like his are not vague. They are precise, detailed, and chronological — documenting specific videos watched, specific years in which intentions formed and reformed, specific online materials consumed. The Internal Security Department does not stumble upon such information. It assembles it methodically, often over years, from surveillance, immigration data, and intelligence work that operates well below the public waterline.

The proposition that this same apparatus cannot identify two individuals who appear by nationality in an official foreign military dataset — a dataset obtained through a lawful freedom of information request — is a significant ask of the reader's credulity.

The silence on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) compounds this further. Shanmugam is not merely a minister who has access to the instrument — he is arguably its most frequent user.

Directions issued under his watch have targeted social media posts, online commentary, and claims far more modest in consequence than a foreign outlet alleging that Singapore nationals fought in a foreign war. He has shown no reluctance to deploy POFMA swiftly and publicly when a statement is, in the government's assessment, false.

He did not deploy it here.

To understand what that silence means, it is worth recalling what Shanmugam himself demonstrated in Parliament on 4 October 2021, during the Raeesah Khan affair.

When the then-Workers' Party Member of Parliament alleged she had witnessed police misconduct while accompanying a sexual assault survivor, Shanmugam told Parliament that police had already spent considerable time searching their records since the allegation was first raised — and could find no matching case. He pressed Khan publicly and on the record for the police station, the month, the year, and descriptions of the officers involved.

The point was unmistakable: MHA searches its records when allegations are made, and when those records yield nothing, it says so — clearly, publicly, and with force.

That same standard now applies in reverse. If MHA had searched its immigration records, travel databases, and existing intelligence files — as it demonstrably has the capability and institutional habit to do — and found no trace of the two individuals flagged in the Declassified UK dataset, the most natural response would have been categorical denial. Possibly POFMA. Certainly something firmer than "no substantiated information."

Then there is the question of what legal tools Singapore could actually deploy if it did act.

When WP MP Fadli Fawzi asked directly whether Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 applied — the provision criminalising the waging of war against a state at peace with Singapore — Shanmugam did not say yes. He said applicability depends on the facts and requires

investigation, before pivoting to the ISA as the instrument authorities have historically preferred.

That non-answer is its own answer. Section 125 was designed for a different era and a different kind of conflict. Applying it to individuals who served in the military of a state with which Singapore maintains cordial relations — and with which it has longstanding, if quietly conducted, defence and intelligence ties — would require legal contortions that even a Senior Counsel might hesitate to attempt in open court.

Which leaves the ISA. And here the geopolitical trap closes entirely.

The ISA has been used against individuals radicalised toward Hamas, toward the Taliban, toward armed jihadist violence. It is an instrument built for threats to Singapore's internal security and social fabric. Deploying it against individuals who served in the Israel Defense Forces — the military of a state Singapore has never designated as a threat — would represent an extraordinary diplomatic rupture with Israel, at a moment when Singapore's carefully balanced foreign policy position on the Gaza conflict is already under considerable scrutiny.

Shanmugam is not a man who stumbles into corners. The careful architecture of his parliamentary response — the qualified language, the deferred legal analysis, the diplomatic framing around the Israeli request — begins to look less like caution and more like the considered management of an impossible situation.

He cannot easily deny. He cannot easily act. And so he has chosen, with characteristic precision, to do neither — while sounding entirely like he is doing both.

It was the answer of a veteran lawyer who understands that sometimes the most powerful legal strategy is simply to keep every door open and walk through none of them.”

2. For Subject Statement 2:

“The backdrop was a report published in February 2026 by British investigative outlet Declassified UK, which obtained Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) data through a freedom of information request showing that more than 50,000 soldiers holding Israeli nationality alongside at least one other citizenship had participated in the Gaza conflict.

Within that dataset, two Singapore passport holders were identified. The report named no individuals and gave no details of their roles or the duration of their service.”

...

“Asked whether the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) could confirm or deny the existence of these two individuals, Shanmugam deployed a masterclass in forensic language management. He did not say the individuals do not exist. He did not say the Declassified UK report was false. He said — very carefully — that MHA has “no substantiated information.” Not no information. Substantiated information.

That single adjective carries the weight of the entire response.

He confirmed a formal request had been made to Israel, which itself implies Singapore had something specific enough to act on diplomatically. You do not write a formal request to a foreign government about people you have no reason to believe exist.

To appreciate what MHA's investigative apparatus is actually capable of, consider the case of Mohamed Khairul Riduan Mohamed Sarip, a former MOE teacher arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in October 2022. Khairul had not travelled to Gaza. He had not joined Hamas. He had not crossed a single border.

Yet when Shanmugam addressed the media on 11 January 2023, he did not speak in vague terms about a general security concern.

He described, with precision, that the Internal Security Department (ISD) knew Khairul had checked specific travel routes and flight options to Gaza, sought advice from individuals based there, attempted to learn Arabic to communicate with Hamas soldiers, and researched the group's tactics and operations. Some of these plans had first formed in 2012 — more than a decade before his arrest. ISD had not merely detected a threat. It had reconstructed a man's intentions across eleven years.

The proposition that this same apparatus, when presented with an official foreign military dataset identifying two Singapore passport holders by nationality, is left with "no substantiated information" is a considerable ask of the reader's credulity."

...

ISD's detention orders in cases like his are not vague. They are precise, detailed, and chronological — documenting specific videos watched, specific years in which intentions formed and reformed, specific online materials consumed. The Internal Security Department does not stumble upon such information. It assembles it methodically, often over years, from surveillance, immigration data, and intelligence work that operates well below the public waterline.

The proposition that this same apparatus cannot identify two individuals who appear by nationality in an official foreign military dataset — a dataset obtained through a lawful freedom of information request — is a significant ask of the reader's credulity.

The silence on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) compounds this further. Shanmugam is not merely a minister who has access to the instrument — he is arguably its most frequent user.

Directions issued under his watch have targeted social media posts, online commentary, and claims far more modest in consequence than a foreign outlet alleging that Singapore nationals fought in a foreign war. He has shown no reluctance to deploy POFMA swiftly and publicly when a statement is, in the government's assessment, false.

He did not deploy it here.

To understand what that silence means, it is worth recalling what Shanmugam himself demonstrated in Parliament on 4 October 2021, during the Raeesah Khan affair.

When the then-Workers' Party Member of Parliament alleged she had witnessed police misconduct while accompanying a sexual assault survivor, Shanmugam told Parliament that police had already spent considerable time searching their records since the allegation was first raised — and could find no matching case. He pressed Khan publicly and on the record for the police station, the month, the year, and descriptions of the officers involved.

The point was unmistakable: MHA searches its records when allegations are made, and when those records yield nothing, it says so — clearly, publicly, and with force.

That same standard now applies in reverse. If MHA had searched its immigration records, travel databases, and existing intelligence files — as it demonstrably has the capability and institutional habit to do — and found no trace of the two individuals flagged in the Declassified UK dataset, the most natural response would have been categorical denial. Possibly POFMA. Certainly something firmer than "no substantiated information."

3. For Subject Statement 3:

"When Parliament asked about two Singaporeans allegedly found in Israeli military data, Minister K Shanmugam gave answers that were careful, precise, and notably incomplete. He denied nothing, confirmed little, and deployed none of the legal tools at his disposal. It was the response of a lawyer who knows exactly which doors to leave open."

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"The backdrop was a report published in February 2026 by British investigative outlet Declassified UK, which obtained Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) data through a freedom of information request showing that more than 50,000 soldiers holding Israeli nationality alongside at least one other citizenship had participated in the Gaza conflict.

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The silence on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) compounds this further. Shanmugam is not merely a minister who has access to the instrument – he is arguably its most frequent user.

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To understand what that silence means, it is worth recalling what Shanmugam himself demonstrated in Parliament on 4 October 2021, during the Raeesah Khan affair.

When the then-Workers' Party Member of Parliament alleged she had witnessed police misconduct while accompanying a sexual assault survivor, Shanmugam told Parliament that police had already spent considerable time searching their records since the allegation was first raised – and could find no matching case. He pressed Khan publicly and on the record for the police station, the month, the year, and descriptions of the officers involved.

The point was unmistakable: MHA searches its records when allegations are made, and when those records yield nothing, it says so – clearly, publicly, and with force.

That same standard now applies in reverse. If MHA had searched its immigration records, travel databases, and existing intelligence files – as it demonstrably has the capability and institutional habit to do – and found no trace of the two individuals flagged in the Declassified UK dataset, the most natural response would have been categorical denial. Possibly POFMA. Certainly something firmer than "no substantiated information."

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"When Parliament asked about two Singaporeans allegedly found in Israeli military data, Minister K Shanmugam gave answers that were careful, precise, and notably incomplete. He denied nothing, confirmed little, and deployed none of the legal tools at his disposal. It was the response of a lawyer who knows exactly which doors to leave open."

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The proposition that this same apparatus, when presented with an official foreign military dataset identifying two Singapore passport holders by nationality, is left with "no substantiated information" is a considerable ask of the reader's credulity.

There is a further irony in Shanmugam's own public framing. At that same January 2023 doorstep, he drew a careful distinction between legitimate support for the Palestinian cause – moral solidarity, financial donations, working through reputable organisations – and armed violence, which he described as unacceptable.

It was a binary that served its purpose at the time. But it has no clean place for two individuals who served not in Hamas, not in a designated terrorist organisation, but in the military of a sovereign state with which Singapore maintains cordial, if quietly conducted, relations. His own framework, in other words, does not straightforwardly reach them either.

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Then there is the question of what legal tools Singapore could actually deploy if it did act.

When WP MP Fadli Fawzi asked directly whether Section 125 of the Penal Code 1871 applied – the provision criminalising the waging of war against a state at peace with Singapore — Shanmugam did not say yes. He said applicability depends on the facts and requires investigation, before pivoting to the ISA as the instrument authorities have historically preferred.

That non-answer is its own answer. Section 125 was designed for a different era and a different kind of conflict. Applying it to individuals who served in the military of a state with which Singapore maintains cordial relations – and with which it has longstanding, if quietly conducted, defence and intelligence ties — would require legal contortions that even a Senior Counsel might hesitate to attempt in open court.

Which leaves the ISA. And here the geopolitical trap closes entirely.

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5. For Subject Statement 5

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6. For Subject Statement 6

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